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Abstract—Reading or writing outside the bounds of a buffer
is a serious security vulnerability that has been exploited in
numerous occasions. These attacks can be prevented by en-
suring that every buffer is only accessed within its specified
bounds. In this paper we present Gandalf, a compiler assisted
hardware extension for the OpenRISC processor that thwarts
all forms of memory based attacks including buffer overflows
and overreads.The feature associates lightweight base and bound
capabilities to all pointer variables, which are checked at run time
by the hardware. Gandalf is transparent to the user and does
not require significant OS modifications. Moreover it achieves
locality, thus resulting in small performance penalties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even though twenty years have gone by since Aleph One’s
benchmark paper in [1], buffer overflows remain one of
the most exploited vulnerability in C and C++ programs.
Malware that overflow buffers corrupt system or other critical
memory regions forcing execution of an attacker specified
code. This has lead to privilege escalation attacks, malfunction
of applications, network penetration, or denial of service. More
recently a variant of buffer overflow, called the Heartbleed
bug1, overreads buffers allowing an attacker to read sensitive
information from the program space. This has been used,
for instance, to leak information such as certificates, digital
signatures, and passwords from a web server that uses the
OpenSSL library 2.
Over the years several preventive measures have been
introduced into systems. One of the first, was the use of
smart pointers in programming languages like Java and C#
to perform bound checking on buffers. While these languages
stymie buffer overflows, they unfortunately cannot replace
the huge amounts of C and C++ codes that is in use and
cannot be applied for system programming. Modifications
were also made to the compiler, for example by the use of
canaries and address space layout randomization (ASLR),
which made it more difficult to exploit buffer overflows but
did not completely eliminate them. The weakness of these
approaches were that they did not try to stop buffers from
overflowing but rather tried to prevent overflowing buffers
from causing damage. In due course, attackers found ways
to execute their payloads in the system in-spite of canaries
and ASLR.
1http://heartbleed.com/
2https://www.openssl.org/
The wide spread use of buffer overflows in several malware,
worms, and viruses, dictated prevention mechanisms to be
implemented in the hardware. Intel was one of the first to
introduce such a mechanism with the NX bit in their proces-
sors. This prevented attack payloads executing from the stack
and other data segments in the program. Attackers soon found
ways to bypass this with attacks such as the return-to-libc
and the return-oriented-programming (ROP) attack [2]. More
recently Intel introduced the MPX instruction extensions 3
to further fortify their processors against ROP attacks. Other
processor vendors are following suit. For example, ARM
introduced authenticated pointers 4 in their recent additions.
In the research community there have been several works to
prevent buffer overflows by modifying the processor architec-
ture. The approaches can be broadly classified as follows : the
use of a shadow stack (such as [3], [4]), tagged memories
(such as [5]), xor encrypted function calls (such as [6]),
signed memories (such as [7]), and by control flow integrity
checks (such as [8]). Encrypted function calls, tagged, and
signed memory techniques require programming acumen to
differentiate between sensitive and non-sensitive parts of the
code. Thus can be subject to human error leading to exploits.
On the other hand shadow stacks are limited to preventing
exploits based on corrupting return addresses. Other vulnera-
bilities such as corruption of function pointers, modification of
local variables, and buffer overreads cannot not be prevented.
Further, implementations of shadow stack require memory that
is typically isolated from the program. This could lead to
execution overheads due to loss in locality.
In this paper we propose Gandalf; a mitigation technique
for buffer overflows and overreads. The motivation is to make
security transparent to programmers thus preventing human
error. Our proposal is (almost) operating system agnostic and
only requires architecture and compiler changes. Furthmore,
Gandalf provides fine-grained security, which is capable of
protecting each pointer individually and blocks all known
memory corruption attacks in the stack and heap. It also
prevents attacks like Heartbleed which overreads buffers.
Gandalf works by pre-pending every declared pointer in
the program with three capabilities: base, bound, and a magic
number as shown in Figure 1. The base and bound define
3https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/introduction-to-intel-memory-
protection-extensions
4https://community.arm.com/groups/processors/blog/2016/10/27/armv8-a-
architecture-2016-additions
Fig. 1. Stack Structure with Gandalf enabled. The pointer ptr can only
access the buffer var2 because its capabilities are set by the limits of var2.
Any attempt to read or write to a location beyond var2 will result in an
exception.
the capabilities of the pointer, while the magic number allows
quickly to identify the metadata. It helps prevent unauthorized
changes to the base and bound values. Each load and store, is
first authenticated by the pointer’s capabilities and only then
allowed to complete. If a load or a store fails this test, then an
illegal instruction exception is sent to the program terminating
it.
We implemented Gandalf in an OpenRISC environment
and tested it with different memory corruption based exploits.
It required about 500 lines of Verilog code to be changed /
added/modified in the processor.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes the overall sketch of our solution. Implementation
of the solution is detail is covered in Section III in terms
of changes made to the compiler, operating system and the
hardware. Some security arguments supporting our scheme is
presented in Section IV. The Overhead of our solution and
some optimizations to improve the performance are discussed
in Section V. Finally, we conclude our findings in Section VI.
II. GANDALF: A LEAST EFFORT MEMORY DEFENSE
SCHEME
In this section we describe the working of Gandalf, the
flowchart is shown in Figure 2. Gandalf performs memory
out of bound access checks for every named variable in the
user program. Every variable in the user program is augmented
with metadata, called the Protection-Header that specifies its
legal boundaries. The Protection-Header is then used by the
hardware to perform base and bounds check during every
memory access. When a variable tries to write or read to
a memory location outside its bounds, Gandalf triggers an
exception causing the program to terminate.
Gandalf ensures that the programmer is oblivious to
the presence of the program-header as well as the bound
checks made by the hardware. The Protection-Header and
the Gandalf hardware configuration (Protection-header) de-
tails are added by the instrumented compiler when the user
code is compiled. The Protection-header is added to instruct
the processor to switch between Gandalf and the normal
mode of operation. Enabling Gandalf involves (a) populating
the Protection-Headers and (b) using the Protection-Headers
for bounds check. When the program starts, Gandalf uses
Protection-Header to instruct the hardware to populate the
Protection-Headers. Once the headers are up to date, it in-
structs the hardware to enable bound checking. Protection-
Headers comprise of the base, bound and the Magic number
for every variable used in the program, as shown in Figure 1.
Data in the program can be of four types, namely a) scalar
variables, b) arrays, c) pointers and d) system variables (such
as return pointers and frame pointers). The code to populate
Protection-Headers for cases a) and b) is introduced by the
compiler after analyzing the variable tyes. However, in case
of pointers, the compiler ensures that they inherit the base and
bound values based on the variable it points to at runtime.
All load and store instructions from the user program
are routed through the Gandalf hardware since these are
the only instructions that manipulate memory in any load-
store architecture. Gandalf hardware performs bound check
based on the metadata available in the Protection-Header
corresponding to the address used in the load or store. Firstly,
the load-store instruction is decoded to identify the program
variable associated with the instruction. Next, we index into
the Protection-Header to extract the base and bound associated
with the variable. Finally, we check if the indexed value is
within the valid limits specified by the base and bound.
Programmers can choose to enable or disable Gandalf
for every program using a compiler option. The compiler
instructs the Gandalf hardware to perform checks using the
Protection-Headers. Therefore, Linux and user programs can
be instrumented very easily to use the Gandalf hardware for
security. Additionally, programs (existing programs inclusive)
that do not have Protection-Header will bypass the Gandalf
hardware logic and execute normally.
A. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions about the attacker’s
capabilities, hardware and the software.
1) The stack structure is intuitive to attackers. Specifically,
the location and contents of Protection-Headers and data
are not assumed to be oblivious to attacker.
2) The attacker cannot modify the executable binary of
victim program. However, the attacker can provide run
time inputs (payloads) to the program, in order to modify
the control flow.
3) Since the data accesses are made only using the register-
indirect addressing mode in OpenRISC, every memory
Fig. 2. Flowchart describing Gandalf scheme Grey indicates the steps done at compiler level and Pink indicates the steps done by the hardware
access is of the form load rB, rA(I) or store rA(I), rB. For
array and pointer based accesses, we expect the compiler
to use the array’s base address in (rA). For non-array
variables, we require the compiler to use the register r2
(which stores the stack frame pointer) as the base. It is
to be noted that the gcc compiler already does this.
4) The two bits in SPR registers, namely Gandalf Enable
bit (GEB) and the Protection Header write enable bit
(PHWE), are to be saved and restored during context
switches. We have made necessary modifications to the
Linux source code to achieve the same.
5) We have not tested attacks that overflow the data/system
variables present on the heap, though our scheme can be
directly or with slight modifications used to handle this.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Gandalf requires modifications to be made in the hardware
and compiler. Typically no modifications are required in the
OS. However in the current version of the Linux kernel
(ver 4.4.0-de0 nano) that was used, minor modifications were
needed in the kernel to save context. This section provides
a top-to-down overview of the Gandalf implementation on
OpenRISC.
A. Compiler Changes
Every program compiled for the system has an option
to turn on/off Gandalf independent of the other programs.
This is done by a compile time switch that respectively en-
ables/disables Gandalf. When enabled, the compiler programs
the following additional steps into the executable image.
• When the program starts it enables Gandalf in the
hardware. In OpenRISC this is implemented by setting
the 17th bit in the special purpose register (the SPR).
This bit is referred to as the Gandalf enable bit (GEB).
• For every named variable the protection-header data
fields including the magic number, base, and bound are
populated. While the base and bound are obtained from
the program flow, the magic number is filled with its own
address as follows.
store[Magic addr], magic addr, where [·] denotes the
value stored in the address. For example, if 0x80012340 is
the magic address then the magic number is 0x80012340.
This simple step allows (a) unique magic numbers for
every live protection-header in the program and (b) an
easy way to test the magic number. To perform the test,
we simply need to check if the loaded data is equal to
the corresponding address.
To write to protection-headers a special store instruction
is used. The processor is made to distinguish between a
normal store and this special store by setting the 18th bit
in the SPR. This bit is called the protection-header write
enable bit (PHWE).
• Resetting the 18th bit in the SPR indicates that all
subsequent loads and stores have to be validated for
memory overflows or overreads. This validation happens
in hardware.
B. Hardware Changes
When the Gandalf enable flag (GEB) is set and the
protection-header write enable bit (PHWE) is 0, hardware
extensions to OpenRISC validates every load and store as
shown in Algorithm 1.
• If GEB is set and PHWE is 0, the execute stage, generates
three addresses in addition to the effective address of
the load / store. These three addresses correspond to the
magic number, base pointer and bound pointer for the
corresponding effective address.
• In OpenRISC’s load-store unit, data is fetched as follows.
1) Fetch data from address corresponding to the magic
number and do the following check to ensure that
it is indeed the magic number.
[Magicaddress] == Magicaddress (1)
, where [·] denotes the value stored in the address.
2) If the magic data sanity check passes then the data
from address stored in base pointer is fetched and
the effective address is then compared with it. If
the effective address is greater than the base then
we fetch the bound address If the effective address
is less than the bounds then the corresponding
load/store instruction is performed. Any violation
will trigger an exception which will cause the pro-
gram to halt.
Algorithm 1: Hardware Protection Checks
if GEB && !PHWE then
Set mismatch = true;
if [MagicAddress] == MagicAddress then
if BaseAddress < EffectiveAddress then
if BoundAddress > EffectiveAddress
then
mismatch = false;
end
end
if mismatch == true then
raise mismatchexception;
end
else
execute instruction;
end
end
else if GEB && PHWE then
/* Populate protection-header */
set mismatch = false;
execute instruction;
end
else
/* Normal loads and stores */
Set mismatch = false;
execute instruction;
end
C. Linux Kernel Changes
Since the protection scheme is selectively enabled or dis-
abled from process to process, the operating system has to save
and restore the GEB and PHWE bit for every process. The
thread start and thread switch functions in the Linux
kernel to save the state of these bits on a per-process basis. It
may be noted that if these bits were implemented in the flags
register, whose state is already saved on a per-process basis,
then the OS would require no alteration.
IV. SECURITY ARGUMENT
In order for memory corruption to occur, the attacker must
be able to manipulate the effective address to point to the
target data as shown in Figure 1. This can only be possible
using one of the following methods:
• Overflowing a memory segment
Claim: This is not possible because each named variable
is tagged with a protection-header and the attacker
cannot read and write into memory locations that are
outside the bounds.
• Manipulating the content of the protection-header
Claim1: A write into the protection-header memory
segment is possible only when the 18th bit in the Special
purpose register is set and since the user has no control
over this bit, any write into the protection-header memory
segment by the attacker will result in a exception.
Claim2: A write into the protection-header memory
segment using a normal store will trigger the Gandalf
check routine in hardware and since the protection-
header memory segment will not have its appropriate
protection-header data, an exception is triggered.
• Generating a spurious protection-header
Claim1:The user cannot setup the protection-header con-
tent via the payload for the following reason: Once the
spurious-protection header content is set, the attacker can
perform malicious memory access if he can generate
effective addresses that are within the range of malicious
base and malicious bound. OpenRISC uses a relative
displacement addressing scheme for accessing data and
hence the attacker needs to manipulate either the base
or the offset part of the address. The attacker has no
control over the base and if he tries to generate a
spurious effective address by manipulating the offset, the
protection-header of the corresponding base address will
detect it.
For example, if the attacker tries to do int a[15]; int *p
=&a[14]+4; p will inherit a’s protection-header content
and hence any subsequent access via p will be treated as
illegal.
The above claims show that our scheme protects memory
segments from getting corrupted by including the protection-
header.
V. OVERHEADS AND OPTIMIZATIONS
Gandalf offers additional security at the cost of perfor-
mance and memory that is required to execute the programs.
We can divide Gandalfs´ operations into a) populating the
Protection-Headers and b) performing base and bounds check
at run-time.
A. Protection-Header Population
Populating the Protection-Headers requires additional store
instructions per program variable, in order to populate the
base, bound and the magic number. The Protection-Header
population for scalar, array and system variables happens in
the prologue of every function. For pointers, the protection-
header is added whenever the pointer is initialized. This
operation increases the overall time required for the program
to execute. Additionally, the memory overhead required for
storing the Program-Header is also high.
Optimization: OpenRISC uses a store buffer to do lazy
writes and hence the penalty for writing data into memory
will not be felt by the processor.
B. Base Bound Checks
Performing base and bounds check at run-time requires
additional ALU operations to compute 3 additional effective
addresses (for base, bound and the magic number). More
importantly, 3 extra loads need to be performed to retrieve
the base, bound and the magic numbers. The extra loads are
issued for both load and store instructions making the clock
cycles required per operation very high.
Optimization: Since the protection-header data has spatial
locality with respect to the current data segment, it is mostly
likely to be present in the L1 cache. Thus an increase in
the L1 cache size may have significant benefits. A further
optimization could be to maintain 3 on chip registers to store
the protection-header data.
C. Compiler Overheads
Adding additional instructions will cause the program to
bloat.
Optimization: The increase in size is less than 30%
VI. CONCLUSION
Memory corruption attacks are a serious threat to software.
Over the last 20 years, several works have been published in
this regard, however recent design trends have necessitated the
need for a robust hardware model which requires less design
overhaul. In this work, we introduce Gandalf, a light-weight
and robust hardware-software ecosystem which prevents such
attacks. We show that the scheme achieves fine grained se-
curity through our security argument. Further,Gandalf nips
buffer overflows at the bud, it prevents all forms of attacks
including the format string vulnerabilities, ROP attacks, and
return-to-libc attack. The hardware or software changes is
minimal when compared to the other schemes that currently
exist in practice.
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